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Abstract
There is a lively debate among scholars and policymakers on whether either consum-
ers or producers should be seen as responsible for pollution caused in the production 
and consumption of traded goods. In this article, we argue that, in conformity with 
intuitive conceptions of causation, the economic incidence of a Pigouvian tax can be 
seen as a measure of the relative contribution to pollution of consumers and produc-
ers. Taking this perspective on the polluter-pays principle can help increase ambition 
in climate change action because it reduces the relevance of the question “Who is the 
polluter?” in climate change negotiations and enables a focus instead on the issue of 
“What can be done?” to reduce carbon emissions.
Keywords
polluter-pays principle – causation of environmental harm – carbon tax – Coasean 
bargaining – Pigouvian tax – economic incidence of tax
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1 Introduction
The polluter-pays principle (ppp) is widely seen as the backbone of environ-
mental policy. It was already present in the European Community’s first 
 environment action program, and later in the Single European Act (1986). Law-
yers have often argued that the idea that “the polluter should pay” is the most 
“economic” of the many environmental principles. However, how lawyers and 
economists describe the ppp often differs substantially. In legal documents 
(and legal doctrine), it is often held that the principle entails that the costs of 
pollution or other environmental damage, including the costs of restoring the 
environment following damage, are to be borne by the agent who undertakes 
the activity which releases the pollution. This is an ex-post approach to the 
ppp. Economists, on the other hand, often argue that the principle is just 
 another version of the idea that so-called negative externalities (which are 
 considered a market failure in economic terms) should be internalized. Inter-
nalization incentivizes polluters to take optimal ex-ante measures to prevent 
environmental harm. In this article, we focus on the ex-ante conception of the 
ppp.
Traditionally, environmental-policy documents and legal doctrine make 
clear who is to be considered the polluter: it is either the producer of a product, 
or the operator of a production process, or the person controlling the process 
that generates the pollution. It has been the foundation of Ronald Coase’s work 
on social cost1 that this cost is generally caused jointly by two or more parties. 
From this perspective, identifying a single entity (such as an operator or pro-
ducer) as the polluter is problematic. To some extent, this is also recognized in 
legal literature, indicating that it is often unclear who should be considered the 
polluter. In the words of Langlet and Mahmoudi, “Is it, for example, the car 
driver, the car manufacturer, the producer or distributor of fuel, or perhaps all 
of them who are polluters in relation to car traffic environmental damage?”.2
It is thus not enough to refer to the obligation of “the polluter” to pay. The 
causation requirement may make it necessary to identify who is the polluter 
in order to be able to apply the principle. Causation has already led to discus-
sions in climate change policy on the relative contribution to carbon emissions 
of producers and consumers (in domestic trade), as well of exporters and 
 importers (in international trade). For example, the contribution of a country 
to  climate change depends on whether the greenhouse gases released in its 
1 Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960).
2 David Langlet and Said Mahmoudi, EU Environmental Law and Policy (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2016), 56.
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 territory in the production of goods for export are ascribed to that country or 
to the importing countries.
Several attempts have been made to solve the problem of apportioning cau-
sation of emissions using economic theory—to little avail so far. The key prob-
lem is that there are no fixed methods or rules to determine the individual 
contributions to jointly caused damage (in this case, climate change). The 
question, therefore, remains whether economic theory can provide an answer 
to the problem of correctly allocating the consequences of climate change to 
the “true polluter”.
In our view, the answer might be found in the work of the person against 
whom Coase directed his famous article on “The Problem of Social Cost”— 
Pigou.3 We argue that, in the absence of transaction costs, the economic inci-
dence of a Pigouvian tax can be seen as reflecting the relative causal contribu-
tion to pollution of the producer and the consumer, in accordance with 
intuitive notions of causation.4 In a competitive market, Coasean bargaining 
will result in burden-sharing that is in line with the proportion in which each 
party contributed to the joint causation of the damage. A carefully designed 
carbon tax is thus able to avoid problems concerning the attribution of causa-
tion of environmental harm, in line with an economic interpretation of the 
ppp. Taking this perspective on the ppp may enable an increase in policy ambi-
tion in climate change mitigation because it shifts the focus of climate negotia-
tions from the question “Who is the polluter?” to the question “What can be 
done to mitigate climate change?”.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the 
legal and economic perspectives on the ppp. Section 3 dissects conflicts that 
affect the implementation of the ppp today. We then argue that the introduc-
tion of a Pigouvian tax on greenhouse gas emissions can solve the problem of 
identifying the polluter, and that Coasean bargaining over the Pigouvian tax 
burden between transaction partners implements the ppp in line with intui-
tive conceptions of causation (Section 4). Section 5 discusses this proposal 
through the lenses of Pigou and Coase. Section 6 elaborates on the policy im-
plication of the analysis, while Section 7 discusses some of its limits.
3 Coase, supra n. 1.
4 In this article, we focus on taxes as an instrument of choice for implementing the ppp, but in 
many cases similar efficiency results can be obtained using emission-trading systems; see 
Ian W. H. Parry and William A. Pizer, Emissions Trading versus CO2 Taxes versus Standards 
(Resources for the Future, Issue Brief 5, 2007). Our focus on carbon taxes is in line with the 
recent statement by 27 Nobel Prize winning economists; see George Akerlof et al., ‘Econo-
mists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends’, Wall Street Journal, 17 January 2019, <http://econ-
statement.org>.
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2 The Polluter-Pays Principle
In this section, we discuss the ppp in law and in economics. We then elaborate 
on differing views regarding how the ppp should be implemented.
2.1 The ppp in Law
The idea of the ppp is that a person causing environmental harm ought to bear 
the costs of his or her conduct.5 According to Beyerlin, this principle “calls for 
ensuring that in every case where the environment has been, or runs the risk of 
being, polluted, the accountable person bears the costs resulting from the pol-
lution or from the measures taken for the purpose of preventing pollution”.6
As Luppi et al. observe, the ppp originally was an economic principle which 
later metamorphosed into “an established legal principle”.7 Bleeker goes so far 
to say that “the ppp is essentially an economic principle translated into law”.8 
This reception has, at times, been criticized by legal scholars. De Sadeleer sees 
a conflict of justice. “The principle contains neo-liberal overtones that appear 
to countenance the idea that the right to pollute can be purchased for the 
monetary equivalent of the environmental cost sustained”.9 Similar critiques 
have been put forward by Sandel, who questions whether everything should be 
for sale.10 Also, Dupuy and Viñuales indicate that cost internalization cannot 
necessarily imply that any costs “can be internalized or, in other words, that 
there are no limits to pollution as long as it is paid for”.11 Other legal scholars 
are more comfortable with the idea, pointing to its foundations in tort law. 
5 Ibid.
6 Ulrich Beyerlin, ‘Different Types of Norms in International Environmental Law: Policies, 
Principles and Rules’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, edited 
by Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 441.
7 Barbara Luppi, Francesco Parisi, and Shruti Rajagopalan, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Polluter 
Pays Principle in Developing Countries’, 32(1) International Review of Law and Economics 
135 (2012), 136.
8 Arne Bleeker, ‘Does the Polluter Pay? The Polluter-Pays Principle in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Justice’, 18 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 289 (2009), 
292.
9 Nicolas de Sadeleer, ‘The Polluter-pays Principle in EU Law: Bold Case Law and Poor Har-
monisation’, in Pro Natura: Festskrift Til H.C. Bugge (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2012), 418.
10 Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (London: Macmil-
lan, 2012).
11 Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge E. Viñuales, International Environmental Law, 2nd edn. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 82.
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In the words of Luppi et al., “The idea that a polluter should pay for the envi-
ronmental harm it causes is well-rooted in Western legal history”.12
Meanwhile, the legal adoption of the ppp has been gradual but sustained. 
We find the ppp in Principles 21 and 22 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.13 
European legislation followed, incorporating the ppp, as noted above, into the 
Single European Act, which was followed by the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Thus 
the ppp is now found in Article 191(2) of the tfeu, which states that Union 
policy is based on the principle “that the polluter should pay”.14 From here, the 
ppp found its way into many different places in EU legislation and the case law 
of the EU Court of Justice.15 Perhaps the most critical policy area where this 
principle has been applied is carbon pricing. In 1990, Poland and Finland ad-
opted the world’s first carbon taxes, and by 2003 the policy of pricing carbon 
emissions had been established for all EU countries through the EU ets.
Beyond Europe, support for the ppp became global in Principle 16 of the Rio 
Declaration. Principle 16 states that “National authorities should endeavour to 
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic 
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in 
principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and 
without distorting international trade and investment”.16 The ppp continued to 
expand its reach, covering additional areas of law17 and regions.18 According to 
the World Bank, in 2019 there were 57 carbon-pricing instruments implement-
ed or scheduled for implementation around the world (Figure 1).19 At the time 
12 Luppi et al., supra note 7, at 135.
13 Siddhant Nanodkar, ‘Polluter Pays Principle: Essential Element of Environmental Law 
and Policy, 1(5) International Journal of Law, Management and Humanities 1 (2018), 4.
14 See Marcin Stoczkiewicz, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and State Aid for Environmental 
Protection’, 6(2) Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law 171 (2009), 175; 
Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law, 4th 
edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 242–3 and Luppi et al., supra note 7, 
at 136.
15 See Langlet and Mahmoudi, supra note 2, at 55–7.
16 See, for example, Benoit Mayer, The International Law on Climate Change (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 74; Sands and Peel, supra note 14, at 240; Luppi 
et al., supra note 7, at 136; and Priscilla Schwartz, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle’, in Principles 
of Environmental Law, edited by Ludwig Krämer and Emanuela Orlando (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2018), 261.
17 So Stoczkiewicz, supra note 14, at 174–5.
18 See <https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/>.
19 World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 
2019).
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of writing, China was launching its own ets, which will make it a leader in 
carbon pricing due to its market size.20
Despite its reach, the ppp has not yet become a norm of customary interna-
tional law.21 Mayer holds that the ppp as an idea “ought to have some influence 
on the development of the international law on climate change”,22 but that 
currently it is “well-recognised as an aspirational principle within the oecd, 
but much less beyond”.23
2.2 ppp: the Economic Perspective
By one reckoning, the idea underlying the ppp is as old as economics itself. 
Adam Smith himself pointed out the need to internalize external costs24 and 
20 Ibid.
21 Mayer, supra note 16, at 74, although Nanodkar, supra note 13, at 5, argues that the growing 
acceptance of the ppp at the international level is an “indication that it is not long when 
it definitely becomes a part of customary international law”.
22 Mayer, supra note 16, at 74.
23 Ibid.
24 See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (London: Strahan and Cadell, 1776), Section 1.4; and Adam Smith, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: Millar in the Strand, 1759), Section 2.2.2.
Figure 1 Global spread of initiatives to make polluters pay for greenhouse gas emissions 
through Pigou-inspired carbon taxes or emission-trading systems. Design: World 
Bank
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suggested tax policy as the instrument by which to achieve it.25 Pigou later 
formalized this idea.26 Tax policy has long been regarded as the standard tool 
by which to make polluters pay, although Dales has identified tradable dis-
charge permits as an alternative.27
The jump from economic theory to economic policy came in 1972 with a 
formal recommendation by the oecd Council to make polluters pay as a “guid-
ing principle concerning the international economic aspects of environmental 
policies”.28 It held:
This principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of carry-
ing out the above-mentioned measures decided by public authorities to 
ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the 
costs of these measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and 
 services, which cause pollution in production and/or consumption. Such 
measures should not be accompanied by subsidies that would create sig-
nificant distortions in international trade and investment.
Almost fifty years later, in October 2019, fifty Finance Ministers agreed to col-
laborate on making polluters pay for carbon emissions, through taxes, trading 
schemes, and reduced fossil-fuel subsidies.29
2.3 Differing Interpretations in Law and Ecological and Environmental 
Economics
While the economic-policy application of “making the polluter pay” most 
 likely originates in the economic-theory idea that external costs should be in-
ternalized, there have been calls to disassociate these two objectives. The ques-
tion raised is whether the objective of the ppp is the reduction in physical 
pollution (a common position in environmental law and ecological econom-
ics) or cost-internalization per se, as an independent objective in the name 
of  economic efficiency, irrespective of the impact on pollution (a position 
25 See Smith, Wealth of Nations, supra note 24, Section 3.1 (“Of the public Works and Institu-
tions for facilitating the Commerce of the Society”), which gives the example of taxing 
carriages in proportion to the damages they cause to roads and recommends this idea.
26 Arthur C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1932).
27 John H. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 
93–7; and Nanodkar, supra note 13, at 3.
28 oecd, Recommendations, C(72), 128(1972). See further Sands and Peel, supra note 14, at 
241–2.
29 Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, Helsinki Principles, Principle 3 (Wash-
ington DC: World Bank Group, 2019).
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 underlying neoclassical environmental economics). The latter position can be 
based on the so-called First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, 
namely that for a free market to generate a Pareto-efficient competitive equi-
librium, external costs must be internalized.30 Under this interpretation, the 
ppp is justified irrespective of any impact of prices on pollution. If this is the 
perspective one adopts, the cost to be internalized is the social cost of carbon, 
meaning the economic cost of emitting an additional tonne of carbon.31 Esti-
mates of the social cost of carbon include, for instance, the economic cost of 
sea-level rise, droughts, and other extreme weather events. This cost is borne 
by society as a whole. Although estimates of the social cost of carbon differ, 
and although governments adopt different measures,32 the underlying princi-
ple is the same: polluters should internalize the full cost of their activities.
Taking the position that the purpose of the ppp is to reduce pollution, not 
mere cost-internalization, Mayer argues that the ppp “does not necessarily re-
quire the polluter to pay all the costs in every circumstance, but it supports the 
view that polluters should be charged some fee that would dissuade them from 
polluting whenever this is likely to disincentivise pollution”.33 In debates on 
climate law and economics, Mayer’s argument has been spun the other way 
round—asking whether polluters should pay for all the costs of their emis-
sions (the “social cost of carbon” approach) or the cost required for disincen-
tivizing emissions in order to reach an emission target (the “shadow price of 
carbon” approach), with the latter often considered to be a higher cost than the 
first.34
Different from Mayer’s focus on the price that polluters need to pay to in-
centivize a reduction in pollution, Dupuy and Viñuales indicate that the ppp 
should lead to an internalization of a negative externality,35 which does not 
30 Abba P. Lerner, ‘The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power’, 
1(3) Review of Economic Studies 157 (1934), 157–75; Oskar Lange, ‘The Foundations of Wel-
fare Economics’, 10(3/4) Econometrica 215 (1942), 215–28; Kenneth Arrow, ‘An Extension of 
the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare Economics’, in Second Berkeley Symposium on 
Mathematical Statistics and Probability, edited by Jerzy Neyman (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1951), 507–32.
31 William D. Nordhaus, ‘Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon’, 114(7) Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences 1518 (2017), 1518–23.
32 Goran Dominioni and Dirk Heine, ‘Behavioural Economics and Public Support for Car-
bon Pricing: A Revenue Recycling Scheme to Address the Political Economy of Carbon 
Taxation’, 10(3) European Journal of Risk Regulation (2019), 554–570.
33 Mayer, supra note 16, at 74.
34 World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing (English) (Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Group, 2016), at 22–3.
35 Dupuy and Viñuales, supra note 11, at 82.
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necessarily yield reductions in pollution. Similarly, Stoczkiewicz argues that 
there are at least two meanings to the principle: in a broader sense the ppp 
implies that the polluter must pay for all the harm caused by the activity, 
whether the activity is legislatively compliant or not; a narrower version of the 
ppp focuses on making the polluter liable for meeting the environmental pro-
tection requirements of existing laws.36
These different interpretations of the ppp can also be seen in the 2019 agree-
ment of Finance Ministers, which states that fiscal policymakers commit to 
“work towards measures that result in effective carbon pricing”.37 This is rele-
vant for two reasons: it is the first time that no less than fifty Finance Ministries 
committed to fiscal-policy action related to the ppp; and the word “effective” 
(instead of “efficient”) supports an interpretation of the ppp that its objective 
is the reduction of harm rather than mere cost-internalization. In an Explana-
tory Note, the Finance Ministers clarified that their commitment refers to the 
use of price-based instruments to reach the emission-reduction objectives of 
the Paris Agreement.38 This suggests that in the eyes of policymakers in charge 
of instruments such as carbon taxes (e.g. the Finance Ministries of Mexico and 
Sweden),39 making the polluter pay has the fiscal definition of applying the 
shadow price of carbon instead of the social cost of carbon. This observation 
does not resolve the debate over the correct definition of the ppp, as the  answer 
to that question is normative in nature. Therefore, even though the theoretical 
debate over what the ppp means may continue, in applied policy discussions, 
there is more clarity: the way lawyers have tended to interpret the ppp is also 
the one endorsed by key fiscal policymakers.
Related to the debate on the ppp’s objective is the debate on which types of 
prices count as making polluters pay. Jans and Vedder argue that the ppp is 
satisfied with traditional command-and-control regulations, such as standard-
setting,40 whereas Nanodkar limits the ppp strictly to the use of market-based 
instruments.41 Jephcote et al. argue that the ppp is a way of ensuring economic 
efficiency and minimizing distortions in international trade by incorporating 
36 Stoczkiewicz, supra note 14, at 173.
37 Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, supra note 29.
38 Explanatory Note to the Helsinki Principles, available at <www.cape4financeministry 
.org/coalition_of_finance_ministers>.
39 World Bank, Using Carbon Revenues: Partnership for Market Readiness Technical Note; No. 
16 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019), Annex.
40 Jan H. Jans and Hans H. B. Vedder, European Environmental Law After Lisbon, 4th edn 
(Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2012), 49–51; see also Edwin Woerdman, Alessandra 
Arcuri, and Stefano Clò, ‘Emissions Trading and the Polluter-Pays Principle: Do Polluters 
Pay Under Grandfathering?’, 4(2) Review of Law and Economics, 565 (2008), 574.
41 Nanodkar, supra note 13, at 5.
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environmental costs in the decision-making process.42 That outcome is 
achieved, according to them, by the trading of greenhouse-gas-emission allow-
ances or the taxation charges on polluting substances.43 However, if the objec-
tive is to reduce pollution irrespective of making polluters pay, they also hold 
that, notwithstanding the ppp, the government can follow a command-and-
control approach with activity restrictions through abatement devices.44 The 
Finance Ministers’ statement informs this debate as well. Environmental taxes, 
permit trading, and reductions in subsidies for polluting activities all count to-
ward the Finance Ministers’ commitment to effective carbon pricing, but regu-
latory policies only count if they “result in an implicit marginal price on carbon, 
such as tradable performance standards”.45 This statement fits with the inter-
pretation that making the polluter pay requires market-based policies, not the 
command-and-control regulations traditionally used in environmental law.
3 Who is the Polluter?
In this section we show that while legal systems traditionally have made pro-
ducers legally liable for pollution, an argument exists to consider consumers as 
the polluters. Thus policymakers trying to implement the ppp may need a 
framework to apportion liability between consumers and producers.
As noted earlier, an implicit assumption in the legal reception of the ppp is 
that the person who pollutes, for example by emitting greenhouse gases, is also 
the one who causes the pollution and to whom responsibility for that pollution 
should be attributed. In many of the legal texts discussed in Section 2, the 
 polluter is identified as the producer, the operator of the production process, 
or the person controlling the process that generates the pollution. The EU En-
vironmental Liability Directive takes this approach.46 It seeks to lay down rules 
based on the ppp.47 It attributes liability for environmental damage to legal, 
42 Calvin Jephcote, Haibo Chen, and Karl Ropkins, ‘Implementation of the Polluter Pays 
Principle (ppp) in Local Transport Policy’, 55 Journal of Transport Geography 58 (2016), 60.
43 Ibid.
44 See further on the implementation of the polluter-pays-principle, Schwartz, supra note 
16, at 265–8.
45 Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, supra note 29.
46 Directive 2004/35/CE of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability concerning the preven-
tion and remedying of environmental damage, OJ L143, 30 April 2004.
47 Recital 2 of the Environmental Liability Directive states: “The prevention and remedy-
ing  of environmental damage should be implemented through the furtherance of the 
‘polluter-pays’ principle, as indicated in the Treaty and in line with the principle of sus-
tainable development”.
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private, or public persons operating or controlling a damaging occupational 
activity. The recital preceding the Environmental Liability Directive holds that 
the Directive’s fundamental principle should be that an operator whose activ-
ity has caused the environmental damage or the imminent threat of such dam-
age is to be held financially liable.48 In the oecd, moreover, member states 
agree that the ppp “implies that the operator of a hazardous installation should 
bear the costs”.49 From an administrative standpoint, it is often argued that it 
is easier to monitor a few producers than many consumers.50 As another ex-
ample, the Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations (while they 
derive the obligations of states and enterprises from the precautionary princi-
ple rather than the ppp) refer to an obligation of enterprises to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions, insofar as they can do so without relevant addition-
al costs.51
The literature on ecological footprinting, by contrast, tends to consider con-
sumers as contributing equally to environmental harm. Proponents of this 
theory do not consider producers and consumers as sharing causation, but 
rather allocate full responsibility for emissions to both groups.52 In the words 
of De Meza, “everyone involved is fully responsible for all the damage done”.53 
From an economic perspective this is unsatisfactory, as it leads to double 
counting: the same unit of emissions is part of the footprint of the consumer 
and the producer. While problematic in this respect, the intuition behind foot-
printing—viz. that the producer is not the only one who causes pollution—is 
appealing. In the words of Lezen et al., “it is intuitively clear that the responsi-
bility is somewhat shared between the supplier and the recipient of a com-
modity, because the supplier has caused the impacts directly, but the recipient 
48 Recital 18 of the Directive reads: “According to the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, an operator 
causing environmental damage or creating an imminent threat of such damage should, in 
principle, bear the cost of the necessary preventive or remedial measures”.
49 oecd Council, Recommendation of the Council Concerning the Application of the Polluter-
Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution, 1989, para. 4.
50 Karl Lidgren and Göran Skogh, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility Recycling, Liability, 
and Guarantee Funds’, 21(79) Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 170 (1996), 178.
51 Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations, Oslo Principles on Global Climate Obliga-
tions (The Hague: Eleven Publishing, 2015), 4–5.
52 See, for example, William Rees, ‘Ecological Footprints and Appropriated Carrying Capac-
ity: What Urban Economics Leaves Out’, 4(2) Environment and Urbanization 121 (1992); 
and Simone Bastianoni, Federico Pulselli, and Enzo Tiezzi, ‘The Problem of Assigning 
Responsibility for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, 49(3) Ecological Economics 253 (2004), 255.
53 David de Meza, ‘Coase Theorem’, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law, edited by Peter Newman (London: Macmillan, 1998), 273.
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has demanded that the supplier do so”.54 Given this premise, in implementing 
the ppp, how should we determine the relative share of responsibility of the 
producer and the consumer?
We will argue that a solution for making consumers and producers pay for 
the relative share in the joint causation of environmental harm is to apply the 
ppp by allowing Coasean bargaining over price signals imposed via Pigouvian 
taxes. Pigou and Coase are often seen as mirror images in their treatment of 
social costs. Pigou argued that the appropriate response to externalities is an 
environmental tax set equal to the marginal cost that a polluting activity im-
poses on a third-party victim.55 Coase instead argued that in situations where 
bargaining is possible between parties, no single side should be regarded as 
having caused all of the externality’s cost.56 For bilateral externalities, the 
harm is, therefore, not one-sided, but reciprocal and symmetrical.57 When we 
put these two views together, the question arises whether it matters if the ppp 
is applied to either producers or consumers in apportioning the tax burden for 
an externality suffered by a third-party victim.
4 Causation and the Incidence of Pigouvian Taxes
In this section, we argue that in a world of zero transaction costs, the economic 
incidence of a Pigouvian tax between transaction partners (producer and con-
sumer) can be seen as the degree in which each party has contributed to caus-
ing the greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon pricing can thus implement the ppp.
Consider the following scenario. There is a competitive market with a large 
number of producers, manufacturing an identical product at zero profit. All 
producers, apart from one, share the same technology, which produces no pol-
lution. The remaining producer uses another technology that causes a fixed 
amount of pollution per unit of output. This pollution is harming a third party, 
which has no means to avoid it. The production technology used by the non-
polluting producers operates at the same marginal and fixed costs as the tech-
nology used by the polluting producer, and there is no environmental tax, so 
the extra cost to society that comes from the pollution is fully externalized. The 
54 Manfred Lenzen, Joy Murray, Fabian Sack, and Thomas Wiedmann, ‘Shared Producer and 
Consumer Responsibility: Theory and Practice’, 61(1) Ecological Economics 27 (2007), 32.
55 Pigou, supra note 26.
56 Coase, supra note 1, at 87–137.
57 Dupuy and Viñuales also refer to Pigou “who suggested a tax to correct this market failure 
and increase welfare” as well as to Coase “who suggested trading as a better policy re-
sponse” (Dupuy and Viñuales, supra note 11, at 81).
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producers all have the same production costs and prices, and all face the same 
residual demand by customers. Is it the polluting producer that causes the pol-
lution or is it, instead, its customers?
In the economic analysis of tort law, the test for such a question is the “but-
for” test.58 The test attributes causation to an individual if harm would not 
have occurred but for the action undertaken by the individual.59 Let us apply 
this test to our problem. The pollution would not have occurred if consumers 
had not demanded products from the polluting producer, given that the pro-
ducer is only in business because consumers demand its products. It is equally 
arguable that the pollution would not have occurred had the producer not ad-
opted the polluting technology. Both lines seem to work, so both consumers 
and producer may be said to have caused the damage.
Another version of the but-for test uses information that we have about the 
demand function. As the market is in perfect competition, all producers indi-
vidually face a flat demand function. Hence, consumers of the polluting pro-
ducer would be entirely willing to change their source of supply of the product 
away from the polluting producer to one of the non-polluting producers. Social 
welfare would be increased if such a shift in demand occurred, since social 
welfare here is the sum of consumer surplus, no producer surplus (as none ex-
ists under perfect competition), plus the loss to the pollution victim. There is 
another but-for condition: social welfare would be higher, but for the produc-
er’s unwillingness to use a non-polluting technology. However, again, social 
welfare would also be higher but for the consumer’s insistence on using this 
source of supply. It thus appears again that producer and consumers are shar-
ing causation equally.
Now imagine that a Pigouvian tax is introduced. The tax only affects the pol-
luting producer’s products; so its marginal costs rise. If the producer passes 
them on in prices, all consumers will shift away to other producers. Because in 
a competitive market with zero profit the producer cannot absorb the cost, it 
goes out of business. Neither the polluting producer nor its customers end up 
paying the tax. They share the (zero) tax burden equally. Hence, the amount of 
58 In this analysis, we are skipping another test that judges apply in tort law prior to consid-
ering the causation of damages, namely the test relating to whether there has been any 
wrongful behaviour, which is a precondition for the existence of a tort. Since the con-
sumer’s purchase was legal, there was no such wrongful behaviour, so tort law would 
not apply any sanctions. However, there was an external cost and damage caused to a 
third party, which is why we apply the but-for test to determine how the causation— 
independently from the existence of any wrongful behavior—could be apportioned.
59 For the legal test concerning causation, see Michael Faure, ‘Attribution of Liability: An 
Economic Analysis of Various Cases’, 91(2) Chicago-Kent Law Review 602 (2016), 606–12.
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tax borne by producers and consumers, and the related responsibility for the 
environmental harm, is even.
Consider now a slight modification. The polluting producer is not a perfect-
ly competitive firm but makes a small profit margin. This might be because its 
technology is cheaper by a very small amount than the clean technology of the 
other producers. For some fixed cost of switching technology, the clean pro-
ducers are not adopting the polluting technology. All the producers still sell 
their products at the same price, with the polluting producer being able to sell 
at a slight mark-up. The consumers still consider the goods of all producers 
perfectly substitutable and behave as if in a situation of perfect competition, 
with each producer facing a flat residual demand function. What does this dif-
ferent set-up entail for the but-for test?
The situation prior the introduction of the tax is identical to the previous 
example. Social welfare could be higher, but for the consumers’ choice to buy 
from the polluting producer; and social welfare could be increased, but for the 
producer’s choice to use the polluting technology. When the tax is introduced, 
the polluting producer may not immediately go out of business, since it can 
afford a slight rise in its marginal costs, but it would not be able to pass on the 
tax in prices. If it does increase the price, the consumers will shift to other pro-
ducers and it will not be possible to say that “Social welfare could be higher, but 
for the consumers’ maintained choice to buy from the polluting producer”; 
 instead, the consumer’s action of shifting away all their demand would 
cause social welfare to increase, as the consumers would no longer be causing 
the social welfare loss. The producer, if it wants to continue producing, must 
absorb the tax in its costs. It must continue paying the tax, which—if it is set 
at the Pigouvian tax rate that equals the damage to the third-party victim—
will equalize the social loss from pollution. Therefore, after paying the tax, the 
producer is no longer causing a social welfare loss. It is the payment of the tax 
and its full absorption by the producer that equalizes the degree to which the 
producer and the consumers are causing changes in social welfare. As with the 
first thought experiment, the proportion of the tax paid by the polluting pro-
ducer and the consumers equals the proportion by which the two sides cause 
the damage.
What do these thought experiments teach us intuitively? We considered a 
notion of causation that depends on conditions of supply and demand for a 
product that caused damage. The actor who insisted the most on continuing 
the pollution after the onset of taxation was regarded as having caused that 
pollution to a greater extent. In the boundary case we considered, the decision 
to continue the pollution was entirely due to the insistence of the polluting 
producer itself to continue its production, as consumers were perfectly willing 
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to give up this product and buy from others. This share of the causation 
matched the relative shares of the tax burden borne by the producer and the 
consumers. Intuitively, the degree to which an actor insists on an outcome 
raises that person’s causal contribution to that outcome. The notion of causa-
tion we considered is thus in line with that intuition, and was how the tax 
burden ended up being divided.
The idea that relative causation is defined by the tax incidence is consistent 
with the intuition that relative causation is associated with the relative bene-
fits of an action. In the second thought experiment, the producer was the only 
one benefiting from the pollution, because for the consumers there was no 
benefit in buying the product manufactured with the polluting technology 
compared to buying the one manufactured with the clean technology. The 
sharing of the tax incidence is proportionate to the sharing of the benefits of 
pollution. This notion of causation is in line with the intuition that the more 
one benefits from an outcome, the more one is responsible for it. Adam Smith 
himself had this intuition. He writes on the burden of taxation borne by the 
final consumer that “His payment is exactly in proportion to his gain”60 from 
the activity that is causing the externality.
In economic terminology, the carbon price is distributed according to the 
relative price elasticity of demand and supply of transaction partners. 
When  the price elasticity is low, the Pigouvian tax reduces pollution less 
than when the elasticity is high because, in the former case, the polluter in-
sists  on engaging in the polluting activity. Such a transaction partner at the 
same time receives a more significant incidence of the environmental taxa-
tion. (The extended working-paper version of this article provides the formal 
derivations.61)
A similar framework also applies in situations outside of perfect competi-
tion; however, besides price elasticities of demand and supply, in monopoly 
the curvature of demand also matters.62 Holding price elasticities of demand 
and supply the same, a monopolist will bear a more significant share of the 
incidence from an environmental tax than a competitive firm, as it needs to 
account for the reduction in demand from its own price increases. This means 
60 Smith, supra note 24, Section 3.1.
61 See Dirk Heine, ‘Does Pigou Make the True Polluter Pay? A Framework For Prospective 
Multilateral Causation of Emissions in High-Frequency Market Interactions’, in Challeng-
es and Solutions to Environmental Tax Reform (edle Dissertation Manuscript, 2020).
62 For a recent review of research on economic tax incidence under different market condi-
tions, see Don Fullerton and Erich Muehlegger, ‘Who Bears the Economic Costs of Envi-
ronmental Regulations?’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 
23677 (2017).
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that a monopolist will pay a larger share of the environmental tax for the same 
pollution, which can be seen as compensation to society for the cost of market 
concentration, which the monopolist otherwise benefits from. What matters 
here is that in both perfect competition and monopoly, the distribution of en-
vironmental tax burdens happens in a way that corresponds to intuitive views 
of responsibility. The ppp is thus upheld by the splitting of the tax burden in 
different market circumstances.
This analysis shows that it is not necessary for a government to determine 
ex ante the relative share of the producer and consumer in causing climate 
change. Given a low transaction-cost setting between producers and consum-
ers, bargaining will take place, resulting in an allocation of the tax incidence 
that corresponds to intuitive notions of causation. Notice that, under the pro-
posed view of the ppp, the government does not need to determine ex-ante 
who is responsible for carbon emissions. However, the government is in a posi-
tion to affect the proportion of economic incidence of the tax. For instance, 
competition law and policy can affect market structure. Since market structure 
is one of the factors that determine the distribution of the tax incidence, it 
also defines the attribution of responsibility for emissions. Similarly, govern-
ments can make the demand for certain products more elastic, and thus  reduce 
the incidence of the tax on consumers. For instance, investment in public 
transportation reduces citizens’ need to use private vehicles, potentially reduc-
ing the pass-through to consumers of carbon prices imposed on the road-
transport sector. As the tax incidence on consumers decreases, their share of 
responsibility also decreases, while that of producers increases.
5 Bridging Coase and Pigou
The view that both the producer and the consumer are responsible for carbon 
emissions resembles Coase’s idea concerning causation. Coase showed that, in 
the absence of transaction costs, and with price-taking agents, an efficient al-
location of entitlements is reached regardless of the initial allocation of rights. 
In the previous section, we showed that if the producer and consumers jointly 
cause the emissions, they will share the effective liability for the emission tax 
according to the proportion by which each contributes to causing the emis-
sions. The advantage of this model is that the outcome will be reached inde-
pendently of how the state perceives and attributes relative causation and tax 
liabilities between the producer and the consumer. The result of Coasean bar-
gaining is that the burden of the tax is split between the producer and the 
consumer through private bargaining instead of through state intervention.
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How does this seemingly theoretical idea work in practice? If an environ-
mental tax on emissions is introduced, producers and consumers do not need 
to set up a separate transaction to distribute the tax burden. The sharing of 
the tax will be determined as a by-product of the transaction. Producers and 
 consumers only need to determine the after-tax market price. There is an (im-
plicit) bargaining between producers and consumers concerning the determi-
nation of the tax incidence. Notice that consumers and producers do not need 
to know their relative contribution to emissions, nor do they need to be aware 
that the economic incidence of the Pigouvian tax determines their relative re-
sponsibility for emissions. Market conditions will determine the distribution 
of the tax incidence between them.
Pigouvian and Coasean solutions have to, and can be, reconciled. In the case 
of greenhouse gas emissions, the radiative forcing of a molecule released by 
any emitter in the world can have global ramifications with long time effects, 
and the consequences depend on the pre-existing stock of greenhouse gases. 
This is a complex situation, where bargaining alone between producer and 
consumer is impossible—simply considering the number of people involved. 
The fact that greenhouse gas emissions are stock pollutants that cause harm by 
remaining in the atmosphere for long periods implies that future generations 
are affected by today’s emission decisions. Future generations cannot, of 
course, bargain with current generations, and they certainly cannot be seen to 
cause the emissions that will harm them. There exists, in other words, a pro-
portion of the damage that the victim cannot reasonably be considered to have 
caused. This subset of social cost can be dealt with through the imposition of a 
Pigouvian tax; it cannot be solved through Coasean bargaining. It is the impo-
sition of the Pigouvian tax that enables Coasean bargaining over the tax bur-
den between producers and consumers, who jointly cause the damage to third 
parties.
6 Implications for Climate Change Policy
In Section 4, we showed that the economic incidence of a Pigouvian tax could 
be seen as a measure of the relative responsibility of consumers and producers 
for the pollution released in the production and consumption of a good. In this 
section, we argue that looking at the ppp through these lenses can contribute 
to progress in climate policy, as it reduces the need to engage in lengthy nego-
tiations on which countries are responsible for greenhouse gas emissions re-
leased in the production of goods that are traded internationally.
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Under the current climate regime, emissions released in the production of 
goods that are subsequently exported count towards the carbon budget of the 
exporting nation. This practice is contested. Some countries’ policymakers and 
certain scholars have opposed this accounting practice, arguing that this class 
of emissions is caused by the countries to whom the goods are exported. Just 
as with the ppp, the question arises who the polluter is in the production of 
exported products. Wang and Watson write that “Whilst the nation-state is at 
the heart of most international negotiations and treaties, global trade means 
that a country’s carbon footprint is international.”63 This problem affects about 
23 per cent of global emissions64 and 23–38 per cent of emissions from Chi-
na.65 It is thus not a trivial issue to determine who should be responsible for 
the costs of carbon emissions released in the production of exported goods.66
Similar to the sharing of causation between producers and consumers, the 
embodied emissions of internationally traded products are jointly caused by 
the entities selling and buying the goods. In this context, the exporter and the 
importer have the roles of the producers and the consumers, respectively.67 
The exporter causes the proportion of emissions that corresponds to its price 
elasticity of supply relative to the price elasticity of demand of the importer. In 
this way, the causation is shared and quantifiable. What would then be the way 
to implement the ppp for embodied emissions?
We would argue that it is the very same policy that China is presently rolling 
out: carbon pricing. It is right for China’s national ets to cover emissions re-
leased in the production of goods that are subsequently exported, as much as 
it is right for the EU to cover in its own ets and carbon taxes the emissions 
released from goods produced in the EU and exported to China. The respective 
overseas consumers will bear a share of the incidence of these carbon prices, 
which is appropriate given the contribution of those consumers to causing the 
63 Tao Wang and Jim Watson, Who Owns China’s Carbon Emissions (Brighton: University of 
Sussex Tyndall Centre, 2007), 7.
64 Steven Davis, Glen Peters, and Ken Caldeira, ‘The Supply Chain of CO2 Emissions’, 108(45) 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2011), 18554–9.
65 Ibid.; and Ying Liu, Kankesu Jayanthakumaran, and Frank Neri, ‘Who is Responsible for 
the CO2 Emissions that China Produces?’, 62 Energy Policy (2013), 1412–19.
66 Zhongxiang Zhang, ‘Who Should Bear the Cost of China’s Carbon Emissions Embodied in 
Goods for Exports?, 24(2–3) Mineral Economics (2011), 104.
67 Equating producers and exporters in this way appears to be the legally correct way of 
pursuing our analysis. In both domestic law and international law, causation and respon-
sibility for emissions are typically assigned to the agent engaged in the activity that 
caused the emissions, e.g. at the point of combustion of fuels. So we can here use our re-
sults for producers from Section 5 to analyse exporters.
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emissions of those traded goods. In a competitive and free market, the relative 
price elasticities of demand and supply will determine both the share by which 
producers and consumers in different countries contribute to causing the 
damage and the related distribution of the incidence of the carbon price 
 between them. Furthermore, the distribution of the tax incidence between 
two transaction partners will be the same irrespective of who of the two bears 
the legal obligation to remit the tax payment.68
This sharing of causation and incidence is independent of how internation-
al climate law accounts for the emissions: causation and tax burdens would be 
the same irrespective of whether emission inventories account for greenhouse 
gases under the consumption principle or the production principle. This result 
is important because it means that policymakers should not engage in long-
winded negotiations about accounting principles. Instead, they should focus 
on progressing with their carbon-pricing schemes, since the adoption of such 
policies would resolve the problem.
A key advantage of considering the distribution of the economic incidence 
of carbon pricing as the relative contribution of different economic actors to 
climate change is that it makes it more difficult to “blame” a party for its emis-
sions, and thus it may facilitate cooperation. The economic tax incidence is 
less visible than the measures provided by standard accounting practices. Also, 
it varies across time, depending, for instance, on market conditions. This lower 
visibility, as well as the fact that the incidence varies across time, makes it more 
difficult for a country to blame others for their emissions. We thus believe that 
it is the right focus for the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action to 
each “work towards measures that result in effective carbon pricing”, instead of 
focusing on accounting rules. With the implementation of its new ets, China’s 
national law has the opportunity to lead the world towards this objective. It is 
a breakthrough for the implementation of the ppp.
7 Limitations
We do realize, of course, that this proposal may, to some extent, sound theo-
retical, especially to lawyers. However, it should inform the debate in legal doc-
trine on the question of who should be considered the polluter under the ppp: 
68 The invariance of the tax incidence follows from the classic result of Henry Jenkin, ‘On 
the Principles which Regulate the Incidence of Taxes’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh (1872), 618–30. See also Kyle Logue and Joel Slemrod, ‘Of Coase, Calabresi, and 
Optimal Tax Liability’, 63(4) National Tax Review (2010), 797–866.
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producers or consumers. We have shown that, economically, both can be 
 considered to cause climate change, but that this shared causation does not 
imply  that the government will have to determine the relative degree of re-
sponsibility of producer and consumer. We rely on Coasean bargaining in a 
low-transaction-cost setting between producer and consumer to determine 
the final share of the relative tax incidence. An important assumption underly-
ing our solution is that Coasean bargaining over a Pigouvian tax works, and 
that the condition of low transaction costs is met.
In some circumstances, the conditions necessary for the ppp to be imple-
mented via carbon pricing may not be realized. For instance, to the extent that 
an entity is able to evade the price signal, the ppp may not be implemented.69 
However, governments can take action to limit the scope of these distortions. 
Implementing carbon pricing upstream, that is, at the point of extraction and 
on imports, greatly reduces opportunities for evasion, because it reduces the 
number of entities that need to be monitored, compared to a carbon price ap-
plied directly on consumption.70 The literature reviewing such schemes finds 
that the carbon-price signal does normally get passed on efficiently, suggesting 
that there is an implicit bargaining between consumers and producers through 
the normal price-setting process. The transaction costs of this implicit bar-
gaining can be assumed to be very low, because it occurs as a by-product of the 
normal price-setting mechanism that already occurs in the market for the 
taxed product.
The suggestion to implement the ppp through an environmental tax is obvi-
ously not new, but traditionally it has given rise to discussions on whether the 
tax should be imposed on either the producer or the consumer, given the 
 possibility for producers to pass on the tax incidence. We show that in the 
 zero-transaction-cost world of Coasean bargaining the state does not need to 
decide whether the producer or consumer caused the pollution and attribute 
the tax liability accordingly. Instead, the attribution of the tax liability can be 
based on administration and compliance considerations only. The pass-
through of the price signal distributes the burden of the environmental tax 
between the producer and the consumer, and this distribution can be seen as 
proportional to their contribution to the pollution.
69 On the effect of tax evasion in the economic incidence of fuel taxes, see Wojciech Kopc-
zuk, Justin Marion, Erich Muehlegger, and Joel Slemrod, ‘Does Tax-Collection Invariance 
Hold? Evasion and the Pass-Through of State Diesel Taxes’, 8(2) American Economic Jour-
nal: Economic Policy (2016), 251–86.
70 Miria A. Pigato, Fiscal Policies for Development and Climate Action: International Develop-
ment in Focus (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019).
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Notice that our argument is not that carbon pricing alone is a viable instru-
ment to meet the temperature aims of the Paris Agreement. It is widely 
 recognized that the mitigation potential of carbon pricing increases if comple-
mented with other measures,71 such as R&D subsidies for clean technologies 
or mandates to label products according to their climate impact, so that con-
sumers are better able to ascertain the climate implications of their consump-
tion choices. Our argument is instead that when a country implements carbon 
pricing, the concern about which entities should be seen as the polluter be-
comes less relevant, because the economic incidence of the instrument can be 
seen as reflecting the relative responsibility of producers and consumers.
We are also aware of the political resistance that carbon pricing faces in 
various jurisdictions, which indicates that it is not necessarily a viable solution 
to implement the ppp in some countries. The Yellow Vest protests in France, as 
well as the ballot rejection of Washington Initiative 1631, are examples of these 
difficulties. However, scholars and policymakers are increasingly proposing so-
lutions, which often focus on carbon-revenue uses.72 A recent article proposes 
a revenue-recycling scheme whereby money is distributed to the public in fro-
zen bank accounts (on the basis of forecast revenues), which are unfrozen only 
on the day of passage of the environmental tax reform.73 This mechanism is 
likely to substantially reduce public opposition during the run-up to the re-
form, because citizens will be keen to receive the visible (and thus salient and 
more highly valued) cash transfers.74 We also want to stress that despite the 
resistance to carbon pricing in many jurisdictions, in the last decade, the num-
ber of carbon pricing initiatives implemented or scheduled for implementa-
tion has tripled worldwide.75 As solutions are put forward to overcome public 
opposition, more governments may be able to implement the ppp via carbon 
pricing.
8 Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that in a world with zero transaction costs, the 
economic incidence of a Pigouvian tax can be seen as reflecting the relative 
71 World Bank, supra note 34.
72 World Bank Group, supra note 19; Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho, and Sam Fankhauser, 
‘Overcoming Public Resistance to Carbon Taxes’, 9(5) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cli-
mate Change (2018), 531; and Dominioni and Heine, supra note 32.
73 Dominioni and Heine, supra note 32.
74 Ibid.
75 World Bank Group, supra note 19.
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responsibility of the producer and the consumer for the environmental harm. 
We have shown that this view corresponds to intuitive notions of causation, 
namely that the actor who benefits from the absence of Pigouvian taxation is 
also the actor that can be seen as causing the emissions; alternatively, the actor 
that continues to emit greenhouse gases after the Pigouvian tax is implement-
ed can be seen as causing the pollution, as it insists on this activity.
We have also discussed how taking this view on the ppp can help in-
crease  ambition on climate change action, because the apportionment of 
emissions released in producing internationally traded goods becomes less rel-
evant. The economic incidence of a Pigouvian tax is less visible than measures 
commonly considered for the apportionment of emissions in international 
law, and varies across time. Thus, if the view proposed in this article is adopt-
ed,  it becomes more difficult for countries to attribute blame to others for 
the emissions released in international trade, potentially enabling more ambi-
tious cooperation.76
76 We are grateful to Daisy Ivanova (Maastricht University) for useful research assistance in 
the preparation of this paper.
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